Emerging Issues that Impact the US-Saudi
Relations
There
are three emerging issues that have direct bearing on the US- Saudi relations
namely the Arab Spring and the Saudi-Iran relations and the US–Iran relations. The
Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2011 can be regarded as a period in the
history of the Arab world that has ushered in profound changes in the domestic
politics of the Middle East countries. Although it has had geopolitical and
geostrategic implications in regional and international affairs of the
countries within the Arab world and in particular in the Persian Gulf, it
remains unclear how the revolution which is still in progress is likely to
alter the international political configuration existing in the region. Perhaps, one of the biggest concerns in the
region for the United States and its allies is the impact the Arab Spring might
have on the biggest regional grouping namely the Gulf Cooperation Council. The
United States will no doubt be watching “the GCC’s posture and profile vis-a-vis
the Arab Spring, its collective reaction to the region-wide movements for
political change, and its delicate relationship with its two troubled neighbors
to the north, namely Iran and Iraq” (Kamrava, 2012, p.96). Any significant
shift in this respect may very well affect the US-Saudi special relations. Therefore
it is important to have a clear understanding of the dynamics of the Arab
Spring by examining the overlapping and sometimes diverging interests of the
actors in the revolution. The popular revolution has introduced new roles and a
new configuration with respect to the balance of power in the region. Prior to
the outbreak of the uprising, the geostrategic and geopolitical configuration
had bee characterised by competitions between states for the attention of the
Unted States for the protection of their strategic and economic interests (Policy
Analysis Unit, 2012, p. 2). Today, they look beyond the US strategic
relationships to regional alliances such as the GCC in an effort to contain the
spread domestic uprisings.
The
current strategic configuration in the Gulf is defined by competition between
Iran, Iraq, the US, and the GCC for influence in the political, economic and military
spheres. Iran has, since the 1979
Iranian revolution sought to expand its influence over the whole of the Persian
Gulf and establish itself as the dominant regional leader. To do this it believes it must minimise US
influence and eliminate US military presence in the region. In line with this
objective, Iran has sought to bolster its military capability including
expanding its missile program, developing nuclear capability and increasing its
asymmetric threat to US forces and US allies in the region. The US on the other
hand has realised that its policy of containment and deterrence needs to be
supplemented with engagement with Iran. Saudi Arabia also acknowledges that
although containing Iran is of paramount interest, the reality is that it
cannot completely isolate itself from Iran. Therefore this chapter in addition
to reviewing the possible impact of the Arab Spring on the US–Saudi relations
will examine the different facets of the relations between Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, the GCC countries and the United States.
The GCC and the Arab Spring
According
to Kamvara (2012), the Arab Spring is unlikely to affect the relationship between
GCC and its powerful neighbours Iran and Iraq (p.96). However, the Arab Spring bears
relevance to the emergence of two noticeable trends in the Arab world. In the
first instance, in a reaction to the Arab Spring, the trend has been for Arab countries
in the region to develop a common understanding that the survival of the
regimes in the various countries requires a counter-revolution which can only
be achieved if they work together. Hence Saudi Arabia increased its efforts to
attain prominence and acquire leadership position in the GCC. Kamrava (2012)
asserts that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia embarked on strategies to effect a
counter revolution to the popular Arab uprising by positioning itself within
the bloc as the chief architect for developing measures to contain and even
reverse the Arab Spring (p.96). Secondly, the trend emerging is that Sunni
monarchies in the region such as Morocco and Jordan are now hurriedly attaching
themselves to the GCC in an effort to create a viable counterbalance to the
revolution.
All
the conservative monarchies in the region including Saudi Arabia and Bahran
view the Arab Spring with concern because it directly threatens the legitimacy
and the security of the ruling houses. In fact, it is perceived as the most
serious threat to their regimes since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.The main
objective of the GCC at present is therefore to contain the uprising within the
borders of its members and to forestall any importation from abroad of elements
or ideologies from outside the region that might threaten the stability within
the GCC (Gause, 2010, p.1). Thus the GCC as a bloc as well as the members
individually have responded in two ways namely through measures to address
internal crisis and through the enhancement of regional alliances that aim to
bolster faltering states.
Tran
(2011) stated that internal crisis have been addresses by increased repression
as well as increased economic incentives; a ‘carrot-and-stick’ strategy. All
across the GCC countries, the authoritarian regimes have decreased the
political space and have reasserted their authority in a bigger way. In the
United Arab Emirates, for instance, the freedom granted civil society
organisations to operate in the political space has been drastically curtailed
and there have been increased detentions of activists (p.16). It was also
reported that a mercenary force has been put in place in Abu Dhabi to counter any internal unrest in the country while in
Bahrain there has been a brutal reaction to an uprising by the Shia majority (Kristof,
2011, p.7; Whittell, 2011, p.27). To
ensure political survival, the regimes have augmented the heightened level of
repression with massive social and economic incentives that enhance the system
of buying patronage that have been in place historically. In Saudi Arabia, for
instance, the state injected over $130 billion into
the economy to cover increases in remunerations of civil servants, the building
of additional 500,000 low income houses and more financial assistance to religious
organisations (MacFarquhar, 2011, 4). Similarly in Kuwait, the
government increased salaries of public servants by 115% in addition
distribution of free food stuffs to its citizens. For countries such as Bahrain
and Oman that are more troubled and less well off economically, the GCC has
provided assistance worth $20 billion for purposes of development projects
(Tomlinson, 2011, p.1).
Saudi Arabia’s Counter Revolution
The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has so far been relatively unscathed by the Arab spring
largely because it has entrenched itself as the undisputed regional leader and
together with allies in the GCC have embarked on a counter revolution that has
had some measures of success. The Al-Saud ruling House in Saudi Arabia have
reasserted Saudi leadership in the region by using its money, influence and
force more proactively to attain the objective. They have been able to convince
Saudi regional allies that the Shiite protests in Bahrain and the Eastern
Province of Saudi Arabia are not just movements against authoritarian regimes,
but first and foremost an Iranian attempt to further its hegemonic ambitions
and predominance in the region by toppling legitimate governments using the
Arab Shiites in the region. Saudi
Arabia therefore responds to any Shiite demands for liberal reforms with
repression and hostility. With
this understanding, Saudi Arabia together with its regional allies view the
Arab Spring as a domestic as well as a foreign policy issue (Steinberg, 2014, p.5). This is why Saudi
Arabia sent troops to assist its struggling ally, Bahrain in the 2011 uprising
in Bahrain and provided Egypt with $4 billion to re-stablish
good governance in the immediate post-Mubarak order (MacFarquhar, 2011a,
p.1). According to Steinberg (2014), during the 2011 uprising,
Saudi Arabia “attempted to stabilise the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies and
backed the army in Egypt, making it the most important proponent of the
authoritarian status quo (ante) in the region” (p.5). The Saudi’s have also
stepped up to take the leadership in
denouncing Iran, calling on the United Nations and other international
powers to “take necessary measures to
stop flagrant Iranian interference and provocations aimed at sowing discord and
destruction among GCC states” (Kamrava, 2012, p.99). In addition, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia has acted assertively since 2011 on the issue of the conflict
in Syria where it has provided the opposition and rebel insurgents with
financial and military support in the fight against the government of President
Assad and its ally, Iran (Steinberg,
2014, p.5).
.
Saudi-Iranian
Relations
Background
The current relationship between Saudi Arabia and
Iran developed out of a complicated and tumultuous past. Jahner (2012) described the evolution
of the relations succintly when he stated that the relationship has gone from
“warm relations prior to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 to a cessation of
diplomatic ties in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the on-again, off-again
relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of
Iran is again uncertain in the context of the evolving political environment of
the Middle East” (p.38).
Saudi-Iranian
relations can be traced back as far as 1928 when the al-Saud dynasty which was
firmly entrenched in Saudi Arabia began to engage in dialogue the ruling family
in Persia, as Iran was then known. However formal meetings between the two
rulers, namely Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Persia and King Saud of Saudi
Arabia, only began after the overthrow in 1958 of King Faysal of Iraq by
nationalist forces. Apart from shared economic goals, the dethronement of King
Faysal of Iraq created a common interest to defend their respective
authoritarian regimes against the threat of nationalist actions ang populist
revolts similar to what happened in Iraq. Furtig (2007) noted that “the common
interest in fighting socialist and radical-nationalist influences in the Gulf
region, in ensuring a stable flow of oil and gas, and in increasing wealth
through exports, united Iran and Saudi Arabia till the end of the 1970s”
(p.628). The British were the dominant
power in the Gulf prior to 1970 but withdrew in 1971 leaving a power vacuum
that encouraged the Shah of Iran to seek to become the dominant power in a
region in which Iraq was a power to contend with and Saudi Arabia who had
already started making overtures to become the regional leader. The Iranian
Revolution of 1979 created a crisis that pitched Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini against US and its ally, Saudi Arabia.
The regional power structure soon became characterised by intense competition
between Iran and Iraq with each country desparately searching for ways to
expand influence and consolidate power in the area. The US realised that it had
to change its twin pillar approach of containing Iran and Iraq to a policy of
developing further the strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia as a strategy
to contain Iran and Iraq (Allison, 2010, p.5).
It must be noted that prior to the Iranian Revolution, there was a
period of warm relations which was based on common domestic goals, complimentary
regional policies and similar government structures controlled by monarchical
dynasties in both countries. There were no
significant sectarian divisions and the
principal challenge in the politics of the Gulf was simply the
conservative-radical confrontation. The Sunni-Shiite and the Arab-Persian
divisions were not considered important in the bilateral discussions between Iran
and Saudi Arabia because the two dynasties were able to overcome relgious,
cultural and ethnic differences by focusing on other common domestic and
international issues in a friendly and harmonious manner (Furtig, 2007, p.628).
However this was not to last as the dethronement of the Shah in the aftermath
of the 1979 Iranian Revolution resulted in the emergence of a hard line Islamic
Republic that introduced a drastic shift in foreign policy with their erstwhile
friendly neighbour. The new regime in Iran questioned the legitimacy of not
only the al-Saud ruling house but of all and monarchical rule in the region.
This was the turning point in Saudi-Iranian relations because the leaders of
the Iranian Revolution were vehemently opposed to what the al-Saud family and
the Shah had been united against which
was the survival of the dynasties. The hardline approach of the clerical rulers
in Iran and the repeated attempts to export their ideology in the region would
lead in the next ten years to a rapid deterioration in the Saudi-Iranian
relations culminating in 1988 in a break in diplomatic relations
(Okruhlik,2003, p.116). The clerical leaders in Iran were opposed to
monarchical rule and argued for a ‘Khomeinist ideology’ that viewed Islamic
clerics as the highest authority in politics. They also claimed that Saudi
Arabia was unfit to be the guardians of Islam’s holy sites. Hence the Saudi’s
held the Iranian government responsible for the terrorist takeover of the Mecca
Grand Mosque in 1979 even though there was no evidence to implicate Tehran in
the act (Kechichian, 1999, p.235). Thus the Iranian Revolution that ushered in
a new ideology in Iran is the main factor responsible for the deterioration of
relations between the two countries.
The
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 further exasperated the deteriorating
situation because Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in the war. The war lasted from
1980 to 1988 and was caused by border disputes and Iraqi fears that the Iranian
Revolution would spread into Iraq. Another reason for Iraq to invade Iran was
the desire to become the dominant power in the Gulf. Amiri, Samsu and
Fereidouni (2011) noted that the Saudi decision to support Iraq was based on
the Saudi fear that Iran and “its propaganda against the kingdom itself,
endangered the Saudi regime and its authority; this is why Riyadh assisted Iraq
politically and economically during their conflict with Iran… loan[ing] Iraq
forty billion US dollars to reinforce its army” (p.680). The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war also represented a turning point in the
strategic power alliance in the region because it was now Saudi Arabia and Iraq
trying to contain Iran as opposed to the scenario before the Iranian Revolution when it was Iran and Saudi
Arabia attempting to contain Iraq. A significant political impact of the Iran-Iraq war was the realisation by the Arab
Gulf countries that it was now apparent that a regional alliance was necessary
to check the expansionist threats from Iran; hence the creation of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in 1981. According to the Secretary-General of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, Abdullah Bishara, “Iran’s quest for supremacy in the Gulf
was the primary threat to the stability of the GCC.” (Okruhlik,2003, p.116).
The threats included territorial disputes between Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE with
Iran in addition to the dangers Iran posed to the Gulf monarchies.
Iran depended heavily on oil exports to
continue waging the war and so Saudi Arabia was able to inflict heavy economic
damages on Iran between 1985 and 1986 by flooding the global oil market with
oil thereby causing oil prices to drop drastically. This particular act by
Saudi Arabia continues to be the bone of contention between Iran and Saudi
Arabia and a major reason for the continued strain in relationship up to date (Jahner, 2012, p.41). Also the 1987
Mecca incident occurred at a time the Iran-Iraq war was still in progress and
it consequently plumetted the Iran-Saudi Arabia relations to an all time low.
The Mecca incident was a confrontation between Iran pilgrims and Saudi security
forces that resulted in the death of 275 Iranian pilgrims and the wounding of
303 other Iranian pilgrims (Amiri, Samsu and Fereidouni, 2011, p.681). Saudi
Arabia accused Iran of inciting violence during the pilgrimage with the aim of
subverting and overthrowing the al Saud ruling house. In fact Iran issued a
statement which as far as the Saudi’ were concerned was confirmation of Iran’s
complicity in the uprising. “Tehran questioned
the al-Saud ‘family’s credentials as safe keepers of Islam's most holy places,’
and called for the downfall of the Saudi regime” (Kechichian, 1999, p.235).
Rapprochement during the Gulf War
Another
significant turning point in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia occurred in 1990 after the Iran–Iraq war when
Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The power triangle shifted
once again and this time it was Iran and Saudi Arabia trying to contain Iraq.
The two were now united in a common purpose to deter Iraq in its attempts at
expansion in the Gulf. The Gulf war ushered in a period of détente that would
culminate in the re-establishment of diplomatic ties in 1991 between the two
countries (Furtig, 2007, p. 630). The degree of mutual distrust began to
decrease as Iraqi aggression forced the two countries into political
cooperation in the region. Saudi Arabia began to perceive Iraq under Saddam
Hussein as a bigger threat to the survivability of its ruling house than Iran.
Soon the engagement would converge to the economic sphere as Iran began to
acknowledge “relations with Saudi Arabia [as] important in terms of oil revenue,
which would fuel the country’s reconstruction” (Amiri, Samsu and Fereidouni,
2010, p.51). President Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran conceded and
accepted that Saudi Arabia’s power in the world oil market would be
instrumental in getting Iran back on its feet after the protracted war with
Iraq. Thus the rebuilding of the relations with Saudi Arabia was seen by Iran
as a vital in the efforts to address a number of socio-economic domestic issues
that had emerged during the Iran-Iraq war (Okruhlik, 2003, p.113). On the part
of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries, the Iranian threat was perceived
as diminished and possibly over-exaggerated. They therefore became less
antagonistic so much so that in 1997, the GCC acknowledged and welcomed the
Iranian intention to solidify relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC member
states. Although a lot of progress was made to improve relations the period of
rapprochment did not last long as new events appeared to test the relationship
between Iran and Saudi Arabia once again.
Post Saddam Hussein Era
The 9/11 attacks on the
United States was also another turning point because the attacks propelled the
Middle East into a period of turbulence resulting in a shift in power balance
once again in the Gulf region. The US decided to intervene in the Middle East
primarily because of the tragic events of September 11 2001 in the U.S; thus
changing the political and strategic landscape of the region. The U.S. invaded
Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to contain terrorism and the power politics
changed almost instantaneousely as soon as Saddam Hussein was outsted. The U.S.
interventions in the Middle East resulted in mixed reactions from the Arab
world and flamed extremist tendencies that increased sectarian divisions
particularly between the Sunnis and the Shiites in the region. The elimination
of Iraq as a regional power increased the influence of Iran in the Gulf region
and eliminated the triangular political power structure mentioned above in which “the three large Gulf
powers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq balanced one another, [and its] replace[ment] with a bipolar
structure pitting Iran and Saudi Arabia
directly against each other” (Chubin,
2009, p.168). With this new power structure, the interests of Iran and Saudi
Arabia soon began to diverge. The most profound factor in the escalation of
tensions and the freezing of relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the
consequential increased push by Iran for greater influence following the fall
of Saddam Hussein. Furtig (2007) asserted that “the US undoubtedly did Iran a
great favor when it defeated Saddam Hussein while simultaneously doing great
damage to its own credibility in the region by proving itself unable to control
and stabilize Iraq” (p.634). However, although the hostilities have once again
increased they still have three areas of common interest namely disillusionment
with the United States policy changes, common domestic issues and regional
conflicts (Okruhlik, 2003, p.120). Nonetheless it is now clear that the
fundamental determinant of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran
is more of the competition for regional
supremacy than sectarian division between groups such as the Sunnis and the
Shiites (Wehrey, 2009, p.xii)
The US-Iranian Relations
The positions of the GCC countries ,
especially that of Saudi Arabia vis-avis relations with the U.S. are affected
by a number of issues pertaining to the
conduct of U.S in the regional and international politics. The issues include
the perceived overtures of US towards achieving a settlement on Iran’s nuclear
ambitions, US strategic partnership in Iraq, the maintanance of U.S forces in
the Gulf and the conflicts in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and
Yemen. The U.S. policy has always been to contain Iran but more recently this
has shifted to include positive engagement. The strategy has been to limit
Iran’s influence in the Gulf influence by strengthening U.S. position with each
of the countries in the Gulf, to help in a negotiated settlement of Arab-Israeli
peace and by building a deterrence and defence capability within the GCC member
states to contain Iran. Although the main thrust of U.S. efforts in the region
focuses on Saudi Arabia and Iraq as the fulcrum for containing Iran, the U.S.
foreign policy plays out differently in each country. The U.S. empoers the Gulf
states with economic and military aid depending on the existing circumstances
in each country. In 2006, the Gulf Security Dialogue was established and according to the
WhiteHouse, it “supports our enduring interest in the region, focusing on a
wide-range of political and military issues, including shared strategic
challenges in the wider region and enhancing partnerships in the area of
security cooperation, counterterrorism, border security, nonproliferation, and
maritime security” (Crowley, 2010, webpage).
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