Renaissance Europe

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527)

Introduction

Niccolò Machiavelli was born in 1469 in Florence, Italy and lived in the early period of Renaissance but his writings were secular works. He was a diplomat, historian, diplomat, military strategist, civil servant, poet, playwright and a political philosopher.[1] Some of his works include ‘The Prince’ [1513] and ‘The Discourses’ [c. 1513-19][2]. ‘The Prince’ is one of the most famous medieval sourcebook and was written by him in 1513. Niccolò Machiavelli wrote the book after retiring from public life in which he gained practical experience in the political space. The book elucidates how political power is gained and maintained and has been described as a revolutionary work that introduces new dimensions into modern political philosophy[3]. Prior to the publication of the book, the common understanding was that the end of state power is associated with extra-political issues such as moral, religious and cultural standards.

Niccolò Machiavelli, in ‘The Prince’, posits that state power was an end in itself and therefore the best way to understand better is to concentrate on investigating how best to aquire, retain and expand state power[4]. Accordingly, he differentiates the discourse on political power from moral, religious and cultural maxims. His basic premise in the book is on how acts that can be perceived as immoral using private moral and religious standards may be useful in political life. He asserts that in the contest for power, good and evil are equally valuable resources that the state can use to keep power. The thesis in this paper is that the position of Machiavelli in his other writings is inconsistent with his stand in the ‘Prince’ and therefore Machiavelli may be regarded as a hypocrite. This paper will therefore begin by reviewing the political landscape at the time of writing of the book to show that Machiavelli’s writing may have been influenced by the position he found himself in the political order of the day.

The 16^th Century Italian Political Landscape 

At the time of the writing of ‘The Prince, Italy was not a unified state but instead was fragmented into small city states each of whom regarded the others as adversaries. Each city-state, complete with its ruler and court, was determined to gain power over the other city-states.[5] Moreover, European neighbours such as France, Germany, Spain as well as the Catholic Church under Pope Julius II were also engaged in power struggle to gain control of the city-states. Machiavelli’s home state, the Republic of Florence, allied itself with the French but the forces of Pope Julius II defeated the two allies in 1512. The Pope insisted on re-instating the Medici familiy as Prince-rulers of Florence[6].

This development had a great impact on the life and writings of Machiavelli because he was a republican who had served in the republican government as diplomat and adviser for the past 13 years. He had in fact written the book ‘The Discourses’ as a treatise of republican government.[7] He escaped execution in the hands of the new rulers and went into exile in the countryside. He therefore fell from his position of power in the government and was now a disgraced and wanted person. He is on record as writing letters pleading for return to Florence.  The book ‘ The Prince’ was written in exile and may therefore be perceived as an attempt attract the favour of the Florentine Prince, Lorenzo de Medici to regain his status in public life.[8] The question therefore is whether Machiavelli is sincere or is a hypocrite. In ‘The Discourse’, he took the position that a republic was a better form of government than a government run by a Prince; a stand which does not show in ‘The Prince’. He only suggests what a Prince can do to become a powerful ruler[9].

The Essence of Machiavelli’s thought

Many scholars consider Machiavelli’s works as seminal in modern political science. It is therefore important to determine the essence of Machiavelli’s thought to answer the question whether or not Machiavelli was a “Machiavellian”[10].

In ‘The Prince’, Machiavelli seems to distant himself from the established classical political doctrines of the day that were based on religious and moral philosophy. The medieval politicians took their cue from divinely sanctioned and transcendentally valid ideas of ethics, morals and justice. Machiavelli on the other hand took a pragmatic approach, focusing on the “effectual truth” of politics that emerged from the adoption of a realistic view of the world as opposed to what the world ought to be like. Machiavelli, in his writing in ‘The Prince’ contravenes all previous socially accepted norms in political thought. He declared, for instance that it was better for a Prince to choose to be feared rather than being loved if a choice is presented. Machiavelli reminded the Princes that violence and cruelty are valid means of effective political action by referring to ancient Princes such as Moses, Romulus and Cyrus, whom the world seem to accept that they are beyond moral reproach yet they used violence and crime to achieve their political objectives.

Machiavelli praises them and makes reference to the fact that they became founders of religion and republics that are long enduring and insisted that this evidence suggests that the effective truth of politics is devoid of idealistic and mythic mask. Machiavelli argues that the qualities necessary for a Prince to be successful politically does not include virtue. In ‘The Prince’, he contended that virtue is incongruent to the inner moral character of a political actor. On the contrary, he argues that virtue in a political actor corresponds to the ability to use power and fraud to overcome the realities in the political space. As far as he is concerned, a virtuous Prince is one that is able to introduce effective laws and institutions and create political constraints that impose order in a chaotic political world.

 In a seemingly contradictory stand, Machiavelli’s Discourses [c. 1513-19] and Florentine Histories [1532] clearly show that he admired Republics and he uses the Roman Republic as a model of a perfect republic.  In one of his works, ‘The Histories’, he analysed the Roman Republic and the Florentine Republc and concluded that the medieval Florentine Republic was chaotic and hopeless in comparison. He attributed the failure of Florentine Republic to the absence of a founder figure like Romulus who armed the poor and placed the wealthy in the senate as a realistic approach to containing conflicts in the political space.

A review of Machiavelli’s works gives the impression that Machiavelli, although a stimulating thinker, draws different conclusions based on his perceived expectations of the audience he is appealing to.  According to Cary Nederman, Machiavelli constantly referred to his own originality[11] but the truth is that he was not able to escape the intellectual confines of both the ancient and medieval thoughts because he paid too much attention to pre-existing traditions.[12]

The Argument

The argument in this essay rests on the context in which Machiavelli wrote ‘The Prince’. He wrote the book in an attempt to find favours with the Medici royal family. Apparently, the royal family had just ben re-installed and Machiavelli was nearly executed for his part in the Florentine Republic. He became a fugitive who longed to go back to his homeland and be reinstated to his staus in the political life of the state.[13]  The book, ‘The Prince’, was therefore intended to attract the goodwill of the royal family by offering advice to the new Princes who had just gained power and wanted to keep the power by any possible means.

It can be seen that the book begins by classifying governments into two groups namely ‘republics’ and ‘principalities’. Machiavelliquickly stated that he was only interested in the secong kind in the book. This is logical because the Princes had just overthrown the republic and are not likely going to be interested in a theory of the ‘republic’. He proceeds to subdivide ‘principalities’ into two groups namely those states that have been governed by a family for a considerable length of time and those that are newly conquered by a family. He stated that the book was about the later group. This confirms the book was targeting the Medici family. The book therefore aims primarily at advising the Medici Princes how to acquire and maintain more power. 

He begins by advising the new Prince on present dangers and on possible future ones. He stated that republics are easy to conquer but almost impossible to rule and that the Prince in effect has to destroy the republic and rebuild it from scratch. With this historical context in mind, the question therefore is can one trust that Machiavelli truly believes in the hypotheses that he mutes in the book. A close look at the Prefatory Letter to Lorenzo the Magnificent that appears at the beginning of the book reveals that he believes that the best way to earn the Prince’s favour is to present him with valuable gifts. In the case of Machiavelli, the valuable gift he has to offer is his historical knowledge of great men. Therefore, the book should be taken at face value as a item designed to please a particular individual. To extend the ideas to become valid for all of humanity and therefore appears to be invalid.

Conclusion

Niccolò Machiavelli was an accomplished political philosopher who lived in the early period of Renaissance.  One his works, ‘The Prince’ is regarded by many people as one of the most famous medieval sourcebook that is still relevant today. The book is about how political power isgained and maintained. In medieval times before the Renaissance, the classical understanding was that the end of state power is associated with moral, religious and cultural standards. Machiavelli disputed that assertion and introduced an immoralist approach to political science. However, if one were to take into consideration the context in which ‘The Prince was written it is logical to conclude that Machiavelli was a hypocrite.

The argument in this paper is that Machiavelli’s political allegiance is questionable because he was one of the architects of the republic and he is now trying to gain a political position in the court of the family that destroyed the republic. Also some of his depositions appear contradictory. For instance, his stand all along has been that of an immoralist politician who believes that the end justifies the means but the example of Agathocles the Syracusan that he cited is a case in which the end appears not to justify the means. Therefore, the conclusion in this paper is that Machiavelli is not being sincere and that ‘The Prince’ is a hypocritical work.

Bibliography

Ali, Mohammed Seid . “Morality and Politics with Reference to Machiavelli’s The Prince.“ 

European Scientific Journal. 11(17) (2015): 233-253.

McCormick, John P.  “Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527)” [online]

http://political-science.uchicago.edu/faculty-workingpapers/ ; accessed 2^nd May 2016

Najemy, J.M. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Nederman, C.J. Machiavelli. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009

Machiavelli, Niccolò. Republics and Monarchies, Excerpt from Discourses I, 55 The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C. E. Detmold, 4 vols, Boston 1882. http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/machiavelli-disc1-55.asp; accessed 2^nd May 2016

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Chief Works and Others, A. Gilbert (trans.), 3 vols. Durham: Duke University Press, 1965.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. ‘The Florentine history’  1469-1527.  London : A. Constable and co. limited, 1906.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. “The Prince”, 1513 http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/basis/machiavelli-Prince.asp ; accessed 2^nd May 2016

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[1] Najemy, J.M. (ed.), 2010, The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nederman, C.J., 2009, Machiavelli, Oxford: Oneworld.

[2] Medieval Sourcebook:  Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): The Prince, 1513 http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/basis/machiavelli-Prince.asp Medieval Sourcebook: Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): Republics and Monarchies, Excerpt from Discourses I, 55 http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/machiavelli-disc1-55.asp; The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C. E. Detmold, 4 vols, Boston 1882.

[3] MORALITY AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO MACHIAVELLI’S THE PRINCE Mohammed Seid Ali,

[4] IBID

[5]  ‘The Florentine history’ by Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527 Published 1906  London : A. Constable and co. limited

[6] IBID

[7] Medieval Sourcebook: Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): Republics and Monarchies, Excerpt from Discourses I, 55 http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/machiavelli-disc1-55.asp; The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C. E. Detmold, 4 vols, Boston 1882.

[8] Cary Nederman (2009) 'Niccolò Machiavelli', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/

[9] Medieval Sourcebook: Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): Republics and Monarchies, Excerpt from Discourses I, 55 http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/machiavelli-disc1-55.asp; The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C. E. Detmold, 4 vols, Boston 1882.

[10] Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) John P. McCormick This paper can be downloaded without charge at the University of Chicago Department of Political Science

Working Paper Series: http://political-science.uchicago.edu/faculty-workingpapers/

[11] Machiavelli, N., 1965, The Chief Works and Others, A. Gilbert (trans.), 3 vols., Durham: Duke University Press. Chapter 10, pp 57-58

[12] Cary Nederman (2009) 'Niccolò Machiavelli', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/

[13] see the prefatory letter to Lorenzo de’Medici

The Lerinja

The Lerinja

Emerging  Issues that Impact  the US-Saudi  Relations

There are three emerging issues that have direct bearing on the US- Saudi relations namely the Arab Spring and the Saudi-Iran relations and the US–Iran relations. The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2011 can be regarded as a period in the history of the Arab world that has ushered in profound changes in the domestic politics of the Middle East countries. Although it has had geopolitical and geostrategic implications in regional and international affairs of the countries within the Arab world and in particular in the Persian Gulf, it remains unclear how the revolution which is still in progress is likely to alter the international political configuration existing in the region.  Perhaps, one of the biggest concerns in the region for the United States and its allies is the impact the Arab Spring might have on the biggest regional grouping namely the Gulf Cooperation Council. The United States will no doubt be watching “the GCC’s posture and profile vis-a-vis the Arab Spring, its collective reaction to the region-wide movements for political change, and its delicate relationship with its two troubled neighbors to the north, namely Iran and Iraq” (Kamrava, 2012, p.96). Any significant shift in this respect may very well affect the US-Saudi special relations. Therefore it is important to have a clear understanding of the dynamics of the Arab Spring by examining the overlapping and sometimes diverging interests of the actors in the revolution. The popular revolution has introduced new roles and a new configuration with respect to the balance of power in the region. Prior to the outbreak of the uprising, the geostrategic and geopolitical configuration had bee characterised by competitions between states for the attention of the Unted States for the protection of their strategic and economic interests (Policy Analysis Unit, 2012, p. 2). Today, they look beyond the US strategic relationships to regional alliances such as the GCC in an effort to contain the spread domestic uprisings.

The current strategic configuration in the Gulf is defined by competition between Iran, Iraq, the US, and the GCC for influence in the political, economic and military spheres.  Iran has, since the 1979 Iranian revolution sought to expand its influence over the whole of the Persian Gulf and establish itself as the dominant regional leader.  To do this it believes it must minimise US influence and eliminate US military presence in the region. In line with this objective, Iran has sought to bolster its military capability including expanding its missile program, developing nuclear capability and increasing its asymmetric threat to US forces and US allies in the region. The US on the other hand has realised that its policy of containment and deterrence needs to be supplemented with engagement with Iran. Saudi Arabia also acknowledges that although containing Iran is of paramount interest, the reality is that it cannot completely isolate itself from Iran. Therefore this chapter in addition to reviewing the possible impact of the Arab Spring on the US–Saudi relations will examine the different facets of the relations between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the GCC countries and the United States.

The GCC and the Arab Spring

According to Kamvara (2012), the Arab Spring is unlikely to affect the relationship between GCC and its powerful neighbours Iran and Iraq (p.96). However, the Arab Spring bears relevance to the emergence of two noticeable trends in the Arab world. In the first instance, in a reaction to the Arab Spring, the trend has been for Arab countries in the region to develop a common understanding that the survival of the regimes in the various countries requires a counter-revolution which can only be achieved if they work together. Hence Saudi Arabia increased its efforts to attain prominence and acquire leadership position in the GCC. Kamrava (2012) asserts that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia embarked on strategies to effect a counter revolution to the popular Arab uprising by positioning itself within the bloc as the chief architect for developing measures to contain and even reverse the Arab Spring (p.96). Secondly, the trend emerging is that Sunni monarchies in the region such as Morocco and Jordan are now hurriedly attaching themselves to the GCC in an effort to create a viable counterbalance to the revolution.

All the conservative monarchies in the region including Saudi Arabia and Bahran view the Arab Spring with concern because it directly threatens the legitimacy and the security of the ruling houses. In fact, it is perceived as the most serious threat to their regimes since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.The main objective of the GCC at present is therefore to contain the uprising within the borders of its members and to forestall any importation from abroad of elements or ideologies from outside the region that might threaten the stability within the GCC (Gause, 2010, p.1). Thus the GCC as a bloc as well as the members individually have responded in two ways namely through measures to address internal crisis and through the enhancement of regional alliances that aim to bolster faltering states.

Tran (2011) stated that internal crisis have been addresses by increased repression as well as increased economic incentives; a ‘carrot-and-stick’ strategy. All across the GCC countries, the authoritarian regimes have decreased the political space and have reasserted their authority in a bigger way. In the United Arab Emirates, for instance, the freedom granted civil society organisations to operate in the political space has been drastically curtailed and there have been increased detentions of activists (p.16). It was also reported that a mercenary force has been put in place in Abu Dhabi to counter any internal unrest in the country while in Bahrain there has been a brutal reaction to an uprising by the Shia majority (Kristof, 2011, p.7; Whittell, 2011, p.27).  To ensure political survival, the regimes have augmented the heightened level of repression with massive social and economic incentives that enhance the system of buying patronage that have been in place historically. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the state injected over $130 billion into the economy to cover increases in remunerations of civil servants, the building of additional 500,000 low income houses and more financial assistance to religious organisations (MacFarquhar, 2011, 4). Similarly in Kuwait, the government increased salaries of public servants by 115% in addition distribution of free food stuffs to its citizens. For countries such as Bahrain and Oman that are more troubled and less well off economically, the GCC has provided assistance worth $20 billion for purposes of development projects (Tomlinson, 2011, p.1).

Saudi Arabia’s Counter Revolution

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has so far been relatively unscathed by the Arab spring largely because it has entrenched itself as the undisputed regional leader and together with allies in the GCC have embarked on a counter revolution that has had some measures of success. The Al-Saud ruling House in Saudi Arabia have reasserted Saudi leadership in the region by using its money, influence and force more proactively to attain the objective. They have been able to convince Saudi regional allies that the Shiite protests in Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia are not just movements against authoritarian regimes, but first and foremost an Iranian attempt to further its hegemonic ambitions and predominance in the region by toppling legitimate governments using the Arab Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia therefore responds to any Shiite demands for liberal reforms with repression and hostility.  With this understanding, Saudi Arabia together with its regional allies view the Arab Spring as a domestic as well as a foreign policy issue (Steinberg, 2014, p.5). This is why Saudi Arabia sent troops to assist its struggling ally, Bahrain in the 2011 uprising in Bahrain and provided Egypt with $4 billion to re-stablish good governance in the immediate post-Mubarak order (MacFarquhar, 2011a, p.1).  According to Steinberg (2014), during the 2011 uprising, Saudi Arabia “attempted to stabilise the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies and backed the army in Egypt, making it the most important proponent of the authoritarian status quo (ante) in the region” (p.5). The Saudi’s have also stepped up to take the leadership in  denouncing Iran, calling on the United Nations and other international powers to “take  necessary measures to stop flagrant Iranian interference and provocations aimed at sowing discord and destruction among GCC states” (Kamrava, 2012, p.99). In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has acted assertively since 2011 on the issue of the conflict in Syria where it has provided the opposition and rebel insurgents with financial and military support in the fight against the government of President Assad and its ally, Iran (Steinberg, 2014, p.5).   

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Saudi-Iranian Relations

Background

The current relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran developed out of a complicated and tumultuous past. Jahner (2012) described the evolution of the relations succintly when he stated that the relationship has gone from “warm relations prior to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 to a cessation of diplomatic ties in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the on-again, off-again relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is again uncertain in the context of the evolving political environment of the Middle East” (p.38).

Saudi-Iranian relations can be traced back as far as 1928 when the al-Saud dynasty which was firmly entrenched in Saudi Arabia began to engage in dialogue the ruling family in Persia, as Iran was then known. However formal meetings between the two rulers, namely Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Persia and King Saud of Saudi Arabia, only began after the overthrow in 1958 of King Faysal of Iraq by nationalist forces. Apart from shared economic goals, the dethronement of King Faysal of Iraq created a common interest to defend their respective authoritarian regimes against the threat of nationalist actions ang populist revolts similar to what happened in Iraq. Furtig (2007) noted that “the common interest in fighting socialist and radical-nationalist influences in the Gulf region, in ensuring a stable flow of oil and gas, and in increasing wealth through exports, united Iran and Saudi Arabia till the end of the 1970s” (p.628). The British were the dominant power in the Gulf prior to 1970 but withdrew in 1971 leaving a power vacuum that encouraged the Shah of Iran to seek to become the dominant power in a region in which Iraq was a power to contend with and Saudi Arabia who had already started making overtures to become the regional leader. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 created a crisis that pitched Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini against US and its ally, Saudi Arabia. The regional power structure soon became characterised by intense competition between Iran and Iraq with each country desparately searching for ways to expand influence and consolidate power in the area. The US realised that it had to change its twin pillar approach of containing Iran and Iraq to a policy of developing further the strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia as a strategy to contain Iran and Iraq (Allison, 2010, p.5).

It must be noted that prior to the Iranian Revolution, there was a period of warm relations which was based on common domestic goals, complimentary regional policies and similar government structures controlled by monarchical dynasties in both countries. There were no significant sectarian divisions and the principal challenge in the politics of the Gulf was simply the conservative-radical confrontation. The Sunni-Shiite and the Arab-Persian divisions were not considered important in the bilateral discussions between Iran and Saudi Arabia because the two dynasties were able to overcome relgious, cultural and ethnic differences by focusing on other common domestic and international issues in a friendly and harmonious manner (Furtig, 2007, p.628). However this was not to last as the dethronement of the Shah in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution resulted in the emergence of a hard line Islamic Republic that introduced a drastic shift in foreign policy with their erstwhile friendly neighbour. The new regime in Iran questioned the legitimacy of not only the al-Saud ruling house but of all and monarchical rule in the region. This was the turning point in Saudi-Iranian relations because the leaders of the Iranian Revolution were vehemently opposed to what the al-Saud family and the Shah had been united against which was the survival of the dynasties. The hardline approach of the clerical rulers in Iran and the repeated attempts to export their ideology in the region would lead in the next ten years to a rapid deterioration in the Saudi-Iranian relations culminating in 1988 in a break in diplomatic relations (Okruhlik,2003, p.116). The clerical leaders in Iran were opposed to monarchical rule and argued for a ‘Khomeinist ideology’ that viewed Islamic clerics as the highest authority in politics. They also claimed that Saudi Arabia was unfit to be the guardians of Islam’s holy sites. Hence the Saudi’s held the Iranian government responsible for the terrorist takeover of the Mecca Grand Mosque in 1979 even though there was no evidence to implicate Tehran in the act (Kechichian, 1999, p.235). Thus the Iranian Revolution that ushered in a new ideology in Iran is the main factor responsible for the deterioration of relations between the two countries.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 further exasperated the deteriorating situation because Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in the war. The war lasted from 1980 to 1988 and was caused by border disputes and Iraqi fears that the Iranian Revolution would spread into Iraq. Another reason for Iraq to invade Iran was the desire to become the dominant power in the Gulf. Amiri, Samsu and Fereidouni (2011) noted that the Saudi decision to support Iraq was based on the Saudi fear that Iran and “its propaganda against the kingdom itself, endangered the Saudi regime and its authority; this is why Riyadh assisted Iraq politically and economically during their conflict with Iran… loan[ing] Iraq forty billion US dollars to reinforce its army” (p.680).  The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war  also represented a turning point in the strategic power alliance in the region because it was now Saudi Arabia and Iraq trying to contain Iran as opposed to the scenario before the  Iranian Revolution when it was Iran and Saudi Arabia attempting to contain Iraq. A significant political impact of the  Iran-Iraq war was the realisation by the Arab Gulf countries that it was now apparent that a regional alliance was necessary to check the expansionist threats from Iran; hence the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. According to the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abdullah Bishara, “Iran’s quest for supremacy in the Gulf was the primary threat to the stability of the GCC.” (Okruhlik,2003, p.116). The threats included territorial disputes between Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE with Iran in addition to the dangers Iran posed to the Gulf monarchies.

 Iran depended heavily on oil exports to continue waging the war and so Saudi Arabia was able to inflict heavy economic damages on Iran between 1985 and 1986 by flooding the global oil market with oil thereby causing oil prices to drop drastically. This particular act by Saudi Arabia continues to be the bone of contention between Iran and Saudi Arabia and a major reason for the continued strain in relationship up to date (Jahner, 2012, p.41). Also the 1987 Mecca incident occurred at a time the Iran-Iraq war was still in progress and it consequently plumetted the Iran-Saudi Arabia relations to an all time low. The Mecca incident was a confrontation between Iran pilgrims and Saudi security forces that resulted in the death of 275 Iranian pilgrims and the wounding of 303 other Iranian pilgrims (Amiri, Samsu and Fereidouni, 2011, p.681). Saudi Arabia accused Iran of inciting violence during the pilgrimage with the aim of subverting and overthrowing the al Saud ruling house. In fact Iran issued a statement which as far as the Saudi’ were concerned was confirmation of Iran’s complicity in the uprising.  “Tehran questioned the al-Saud ‘family’s credentials as safe keepers of Islam's most holy places,’ and called for the downfall of the Saudi regime” (Kechichian, 1999, p.235).

Rapprochement  during the Gulf War

Another significant turning point in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia  occurred in 1990 after the Iran–Iraq war when Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The power triangle shifted once again and this time it was Iran and Saudi Arabia trying to contain Iraq. The two were now united in a common purpose to deter Iraq in its attempts at expansion in the Gulf. The Gulf war ushered in a period of détente that would culminate in the re-establishment of diplomatic ties in 1991 between the two countries (Furtig, 2007, p. 630). The degree of mutual distrust began to decrease as Iraqi aggression forced the two countries into political cooperation in the region. Saudi Arabia began to perceive Iraq under Saddam Hussein as a bigger threat to the survivability of its ruling house than Iran. Soon the engagement would converge to the economic sphere as Iran began to acknowledge “relations with Saudi Arabia [as] important in terms of oil revenue, which would fuel the country’s reconstruction” (Amiri, Samsu and Fereidouni, 2010, p.51). President Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran conceded and accepted that Saudi Arabia’s power in the world oil market would be instrumental in getting Iran back on its feet after the protracted war with Iraq. Thus the rebuilding of the relations with Saudi Arabia was seen by Iran as a vital in the efforts to address a number of socio-economic domestic issues that had emerged during the Iran-Iraq war (Okruhlik, 2003, p.113). On the part of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries, the Iranian threat was perceived as diminished and possibly over-exaggerated. They therefore became less antagonistic so much so that in 1997, the GCC acknowledged and welcomed the Iranian intention to solidify relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states. Although a lot of progress was made to improve relations the period of rapprochment did not last long as new events appeared to test the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia once again.

Post Saddam Hussein Era

The 9/11 attacks on the United States was also another turning point because the attacks propelled the Middle East into a period of turbulence resulting in a shift in power balance once again in the Gulf region. The US decided to intervene in the Middle East primarily because of the tragic events of September 11 2001 in the U.S; thus changing the political and strategic landscape of the region. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to contain terrorism and the power politics changed almost instantaneousely as soon as Saddam Hussein was outsted. The U.S. interventions in the Middle East resulted in mixed reactions from the Arab world and flamed extremist tendencies that increased sectarian divisions particularly between the Sunnis and the Shiites in the region. The elimination of Iraq as a regional power increased the influence of Iran in the Gulf region and eliminated the triangular political power structure mentioned above  in which “the three large Gulf powers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq balanced one another, [and its] replace[ment] with a bipolar structure pitting Iran and Saudi Arabia directly against each other” (Chubin, 2009, p.168). With this new power structure, the interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia soon began to diverge. The most profound factor in the escalation of tensions and the freezing of relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the consequential increased push by Iran for greater influence following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Furtig (2007) asserted that “the US undoubtedly did Iran a great favor when it defeated Saddam Hussein while simultaneously doing great damage to its own credibility in the region by proving itself unable to control and stabilize Iraq” (p.634). However, although the hostilities have once again increased they still have three areas of common interest namely disillusionment with the United States policy changes, common domestic issues and regional conflicts (Okruhlik, 2003, p.120). Nonetheless it is now clear that the fundamental determinant of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is  more of the competition for regional supremacy than sectarian division between groups such as the Sunnis and the Shiites (Wehrey, 2009, p.xii)

The US-Iranian Relations

The positions of the GCC countries , especially that of Saudi Arabia vis-avis relations with the U.S. are affected by a number  of issues pertaining to the conduct of U.S in the regional and international politics. The issues include the perceived overtures of US towards achieving a settlement on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, US strategic partnership in Iraq, the maintanance of U.S forces in the Gulf and the conflicts in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen. The U.S. policy has always been to contain Iran but more recently this has shifted to include positive engagement. The strategy has been to limit Iran’s influence in the Gulf influence by strengthening U.S. position with each of the countries in the Gulf, to help in a negotiated settlement of Arab-Israeli peace and by building a deterrence and defence capability within the GCC member states to contain Iran. Although the main thrust of U.S. efforts in the region focuses on Saudi Arabia and Iraq as the fulcrum for containing Iran, the U.S. foreign policy plays out differently in each country. The U.S. empoers the Gulf states with economic and military aid depending on the existing circumstances in each country. In 2006, the Gulf Security Dialogue was established and according to the WhiteHouse, it “supports our enduring interest in the region, focusing on a wide-range of political and military issues, including shared strategic challenges in the wider region and enhancing partnerships in the area of security cooperation, counterterrorism, border security, nonproliferation, and maritime security” (Crowley, 2010, webpage).

Allison, M (2010). U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition:  Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies

http://csis.org/files/publication/101207_US_Competition_with_Iran_Saudi_Arabia.pdf

Amiri, R., Samsu,K and Fereidouni,H (2010)  “Iran’s Economic Considerations after

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The first impression gathered in both advertisements is that the promotions are just tools to communicate brand message and are focused directly at the consumers. There is no evidence of any suggestions to wholesalers or retailers in the marketing chain. Thus it is very much a pull strategy (Bovee et at., 1995). Mini and Smart are products that are already well known in the market and the effectiveness of this strategy will depend on the objectives the respective companies in initiating the advertisements.

If the objectives include the motivation of people to make a purchase then the adverts are not likely going to be very effective. However if they are designed to trigger an interest in the consumer to make a search for further information  or to test drive then it seems more relevant even though there is no contact address or description of possible sources of information.

In both cases, there is a direct appeal to possible needs of the potential customer that will place the product in a class of its own. The Smart advert talks about 90 degrees parking while the Mini advert is concerned with rounding corners. The similarity in both tactics also includes the use of photographic tricks to attract the attention of the reader. This, although effective in reinforcing a customer attitude, is hardly enough to obtain a customer persuasion. There is no other visible effort to link the products to the target audience. Jones (1992) suggested that an effective advert should have one or both of the two types of appeals namely logical and emotional appeals. Although I believe the advertisements are trying to use communication techniques, clearly there is no logical appeal and emotional appeal is present but needs enhancement. It is difficult from the advert to place value or quality or to relate to any human emotions or senses.

There are five well established strategies for creative messages, according to Tuckwell (1998).  These include the use of Testimonials, Endorsements, Product demonstration, Product-as –a-hero, Torture test and Product comparison. In addition Petty and Cacioppo (1986) stated that advertisement of products such as vehicles are best approached using the central route process of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) while Healy (2007) showed that a vast majority of advertisements in many industries are founded on emotional appeals. In the case of the adverts in question, the emotional appeal is on the shapes of the cars. This could be enhanced by appealing expressly to the prestige that is attached to the ownership of the cars.

 The ELM is a model that is being used here and is an attempt to affect attitudinal and behavioral brand loyalty using low vs. high-involvement conditions. The fundamental concept is to appeal to the audience by demonstrating why the potential customer should act favorably. The advertisers therefore have to choose between transformational and informational appeals. The emotional appeals can be of two types; either positive or negative. Positive emotions include things like pride and happiness while negative emotions include fear. Thus the two adverts are using positive emotions to influence the potential consumers in their attitude towards the vehicles. Aaker et al (1992) stated that in using ELM adverts often rely on the stirring up of emotions based on perceived effectiveness.

The elaboration likelihood of the advertisement is the critical factor in its effectiveness. When it is high the central route is very effective and when it is low the peripheral route method is more effective (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). This is because the central route consists mainly of ideas and concepts that are to be digested and scrutinized. Advertisements that use this route must be able to present to the audience material to get them involved in some logical thinking. (Benoit et al., 2001).

One of the main disadvantages of using the central route is that it requires the audience to be affected in one way or the other by the idea being put forward and in addition must have the interest and capacity to analyze this However when these conditions are satisfied, the effects last longer and are therefore more permanent than the peripheral route. It is more effective in seeking for brand loyalty for instance.

The peripheral route of persuasion on the other hand is more relevant to the two advertisements. It uses the method of attracting the audience with factors that are irrelevant to the actual contents of the adverts. It employs a mix of marketing and public relations. Although peripheral persuasions are able to produce behavioral changes they need to be repeated over and over again in order to have a long lasting effect (Moore, 2001).

References

Asker, David A., Rajeev Batra, and John G. Myers (1992), Advertising Management, 4th ed.,

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Bovee, Courtland, John Thill, George Dovel, and Marian Wood (1995), “Advertising

Excellence”, McGraw Hill, New York, NY.

Jones, John, (1986), “What’s in a Name: Advertising and the Concepts of Brands”,

Lexington Books, New York.

Moore, Charlie. (2001, Fall). Elaboration Likelihood Model. Retrieved May 20, 2003

www.ciaadvertising.org/student_account/fall_01.

Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1986), Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral

routes to persuasion. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Tuckwell, Keith, (1998), “Canadian Advertising in Action”, Prentice Hall, Scarborough, On.